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A Comparative Analysis of New 
Jersey's Mount Laurel Cases with the 
Berenson Cases in New York 
John R. Nolon* 
I. Introduction 
Due to the widespread concern over the lack of affordable 
housing in New York, renewed interest has been expressed in 
the landmark caseof Berenson v. Town of New Castle.' That 
case and an associated line of decisions define the legal rules 
that will be used by the courts in New York to decide whether 
municipal zoning unconstitutionally excludes affordable types 
of housing. Interest has been piqued further by two recent 
lower court cases in New York which differ greatly in their 
approach to defining the legal standards to be used in review- 
ing allegedly exclusionary land use practices. 
The rules adopted by the appellate courts in New York 
differ in degree from those rules applied in New Jersey under 
the Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel2 cases (commonly known as Mount Laurel I 
* John R. Nolon, J.D., University of Michigan Law School; Member, American 
Bar Association, Section on Urban, State and Local Government Law. He has served 
as an advisor to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the 
President's Council on Development Choices for the 1980's. 
Through his real estate counselling and law practice, he represents private and 
public sector clients regarding real estate transactions, land use, and affordable hous- 
ing. He has written housing policy statements adopted by localities, including 
Princeton, New Jersey and Macon, Georgia. He is currently an Adjunct Professor at  
Pace University School of Law and is a frequent contributor to professional publica- 
tions, including the Urban Lawyer. He has also written several technical guidebooks 
in the field. 
1. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). 
2. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)(Mount Laurel 0; Southern Bur- 
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 
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and Mount Laurel II), although the courts in both states have 
based their decisions on remarkably similar constitutional 
principles. At issue in these cases is whether local zoning ordi- 
nances which exclude certain types of housing generally recog- 
nized as being more affordable, are invalid because of their 
tendency to exclude from the community a large segment of 
those in need of housing in the region. The basic inquiry in 
the cases is whether, and to what extent, the state constitu- 
tion requires zoning jurisdictions to recognize and accomodate 
regional housing needs, particularly of lower income people. 
The consequence of the Mount Laurel decisions has been 
rezoning by communities throughout New Jersey, which has 
resulted in the construction of a large number of lower- and 
middle-income housing units.3 Throughout the state of New 
Jersey, land has been rezoned to  provide for higher density 
residential development with the requirement that a percent- 
age (usually twenty percent) of the resultant dwelling units be 
sold or rented at  prices affordable to lower income house- 
holds.' The bulk of the units (approximately eighty percent of 
those produced) are generally affordable to middle income 
households. Market forces have dictated this result. Thus, re- 
zoning under Mount Laurel II results in the production of 
housing for a wide spectrum of income groups many of which 
otherwise could not afford housing produced in the New 
Jersey market. 
Under the Berenson cases in New York, rezoning has oc- 
curred but it will not result in the production of affordable 
housing for moderate income households. The direct effect of 
the Berenson cases has been limited mainly to the defendant 
m~nicipality.~ As a result of these rulings, New Castle has re- 
(1983)(Mount Laurel 11). 
3. See D. Kinsey, Affordable Housing in Central New Jersey: The Consequences 
of Mount Laurel I1 (April 30, 1986) [hereinafter Kinsey & Hand] (Report prepared 
by Kinsey & Hand, Princeton. N.J., for Middlesex Somerset Mercer Regional Coun- 
cil, Inc., Princeton, N.J.). 
4. See Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 256-57, 456 A.2d at 441. 
5. The contested parcel of land in the Town of New Castle is currently being 
developed. On that site, one hundred seventy-seven condominiums will be built at 
just over three units per acre. They will sell for from one hundred and eighty thou- 
sand dollars to three hundred thousand dollars. 
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vised its zoning to provide for a variety of housing types, gen- 
erally considered to be more affordable than single-family 
homes constructed on individual 10ts.~ Under this revised or- 
dinance, approximately five hundred medium density town- 
houses or condominiums have been constructed, some of 
which have been marketed a t  relatively affordable prices 
(under one hundred thousand dollars). Applications are pend- 
ing for multi-family housing on land rezoned under Berenson. 
There are also other sites zoned for multi-family housing that 
may be developed in the future. The indirect effect of the 
Berenson case on the provision of multi-family housing can- 
not be measured accurately. In Westchester County (where 
New Castle is located) and the surrounding counties, several 
communities have rezoned land for multi-family housing in 
response to threatened litigation under Beren~on.~  
The central question raised by these events is how two 
sister state courts could evaluate similar facts and come to de- 
cisions that have produced such remarkably different results. 
This is particularly curious in view of the relatively similar 
constitutional principles enunciated by the highest court in 
both states in these cases. A description of the legal thought 
process in New York, and a point by point comparison of the 
holdings in each state will assist in understanding why afford- 
able housing is being produced in New Jersey but not in New 
York. 
11. Summary of the Berenson Line of Cases 
The first Berenson case was brought in the early 1970's 
by Mitchell Berenson against the Town of New Castle in 
Westchester County, New York. The plaintiff was a land de- 
veloper aggrieved by the absence of any provision in the New 
6. New Castle, N.Y., Local Law No. 16 (1979). 
7. In the Town of North Hempstead, New York, a zoning provision requiring 
local residency as a condition for eligibility to occupancy housing in a senior citizens 
zoning district was held unconstitutional under Berenson. Allen v. Town of North 
Hempstead, 103 A.D.2d 144, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1984). This case did not result in the 
production of housing, but it did open existing housing in the town to elderly resi- 
dents of surrounding communities. 
Heinonline - -  4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 5 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 7  
6 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4 
Castle ordinances that allowed the construction of multi-fam- 
ily housing. His claim, briefly stated was as follows: 
1. That the town derived its authority to zone from the 
state constitution through specific authority delegated by the 
State legislature. 
2. That this authority had to be exercised in the interest 
of all the people of the State. 
3. That zoning which prohibits the construction of more 
affordable types of housing, such as multi-family housing, by 
definition excludes a large segment of the State's population. 
4. That an effective method for the courts to use to rem- 
edy this wrong would be to allow the plaintiff, as a builder, to 
build multi-family housing. 
The case was initially brought in the Supreme Court in West- 
chester C o ~ n t y . ~  Both parties presented motions for summary 
judgment which were denied. Both appealed the denial to the 
appellate division, which affirmed the lower court dec is i~n .~  
Appeal was then taken to the New York Court of Appeals, the 
state's highest court, which took the opportunity to instruct 
the lower court on how to proceed at the trial level in review- 
ing the Berenson claim. 
The first formal opinion was rendered by the New York 
Court of Appeals on December 2, 1975.1° It established a two- 
prong test to be applied when determining the reasonableness 
of local zoning ordinances. The two factors are: (1) whether 
the town has provided a properly balanced and well ordered 
plan for the community-that is, are the present and future 
housing needs of all the town's residents met;" and (2) were 
regional needs considered.12 After adopting these guidelines, 
the state's highest court remanded the case for trial to the 
8. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, No. 04239173 (Westchester County Sup. Ct., 
Nov. 9, 1973). 
9. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 44 A.D.2d 839, 355 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1974); 
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 44 A.D.2d 564, 353 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1974). 
10. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). 
11. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81. 
12. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. 
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Supreme Court in Westchester County. The Berenson13 case 
was decided by the supreme court, on December 6, 1977. After 
a trial on the issues, Judge Trainor found that New Castle's 
ordinance violated both prongs of the test. The zoning ordi- 
nance was declared invalid to the extent that i t  failed to allow 
for multi-family development a t  densities of a t  least eight 
units to the acre. New Castle was directed to issue a building 
permit for the project and given six months to amend its ordi- 
nances to provide for the construction of three thousand five 
hundred units of multi-family housing over a ten year period. 
The decision was then appealed by New Castle. That case was 
decided by the appellate division, on April 23, 1979." The 
court upheld the Westchester County Supreme Court's decla- 
ration of invalidity of the ordinance itself and the rezoning of 
plaintiffs land.l5 However, it reversed the lower court's judi- 
cially prescribed "fair share" goal as well as its order that 
New Castle award a specific density for the plaintiffs develop- 
ment.'$ The court gave the Town of New Castle six months to 
remedy the constitutional defects in its zoning ordinance." 
The Town of New Castle again found itself in 1983 de- 
fending its zoning ordinance. This time, in Blitz v. Town of 
New Castle,18 the plaintiffs challenged the amended zoning 
ordinance adopted by New Castle as required by the April 
1979 Berenson decision. That amendment had been sustained 
by the Westchester County Supreme Court after a trial on the 
facts.le The amended ordinance included new multi-family 
zones, minimum densities with bonuses for certain project fea- 
tures, floating zones with medium densities, and accessory 
apartment  provision^.^^ The appellate division sustained the 
lower court's findings regarding the ordinance's constitution- 
13. Unpublished opinion, Westchester County Sup. Ct. (Dec. 30, 19771, discussed 
in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506,507,415 N.Y.S.2d 669,670 (1979). 
14. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979). 
15. Id. at 523-24, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 680. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1983). 
19. Unpublished opinion discussed in Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 
94, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (1983). 
20. See Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 94-95, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 833-34. 
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a l i t ~ . ~ '  The court relied upon the County Planning Commis- 
sioner's approval of the 0rdinance,2~ gave a presumption of va- 
lidity to the county's adopted housing goal,2s and found that 
the ordinance accommodated New Castle's expected propor- 
tionate share of that legislatively defined housing need.24 
In 1980, in Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. u. Village of Upper 
BrookuilleJ2~he Berenson issues returned to the New York 
Court of Appeals for the first time since 1975. The Village of 
Upper Brookville, in this case, appealed an appellate division 
ruling that its five acre, minimum-lot size zoning was invalid 
under B e r e n s ~ n . ~ ~  The court of appeals reversed the appellate 
division and sustained the zoning, in the absence of any show- 
ing at the trial that Upper Brookville had failed to consider 
regional housing needs and that such needs were un~atisfied.~~ 
The court of appeals found that the evidence provided at trial 
failed to prove that the ordinance was enacted with an "exclu- 
sionary purpose," or that it ignored regional needs and had an 
unjustifiable exclusionary effect.z8 This additional factor, 
whether an ordinance has an "exclusionary purpose," as set 
forth by the court of appeals in Kurzius, is now considered to 
be a third prong of the test by which New York courts will 
evaluate municipal zoning ordinances. Applying these criteria 
to the ordinance in question, the court held that the plaintiff 
had not sustained the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
constitutionality normally accorded such  ordinance^.^^ 
In Allen u. Town of North H e m p ~ t e a d , ~ ~  decided in 1984, 
21. Id. at  102, 463 N.Y.S.2d a t  838. 
22. Id. at  96, 463 N.Y.S.2d at  834. 
23. Id. at 97-98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835. 
24. Id. at  98-100, 463 N.Y.S.2d at  836-37. 
25. 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 1042 (1981). 
26. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 67 A.D.2d 70, 414 
N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979). 
27. Kurzius, 51 N.Y.2d at  346, 414 N.E.2d at  684, 434 N.Y.S.2d at  184. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. 103 A.D.2d 144, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1984). This case was decided by the Ap- 
pellate Division of the Second Department which handed down the 1979 Berenson 
decision. 
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a durational residency requirement imposed as a pre-condi- 
tion to qualifying for residence in a Golden Age Residence 
District in North Hempstead was found to violate the Beren- 
son and Kurzius tests, and thus to be unconstitutional. The 
court determined that such a requirement was enacted with 
an exclusionary purpose and failed to consider regional hous- 
ing needs. The court wrote that "[tlhe durational residence 
requirement a t  bar has a more direct exclusionary effect on 
nonresidents like plaintiffs than the almost total exclusion of 
multi-family housing held to be unconstitutional by this court 
[in Be rens~n] . "~~  Here, ample proof regarding the needs of 
senior citizens in surrounding communities was placed on the 
record. 
In the case of Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of 
B r o o k h a ~ e n , ~ ~  currently pending before the New York Court 
of  appeal^,^^ low-income plaintiffs have argued that the Town 
of Brookhaven's failure to zone to provide for low- and moder- 
ate-income housing, not simply multi-family housing, is in vi- 
olation of the Berenson standards. At issue in Suffolk Hous- 
ing Services, is whether it is sufficient for a municipality to 
zone allowing for an array of housing types (which the Village 
of Brookhaven did), or whether there is a constitutional obli- 
gation to go further and facilitate the development of housing 
specifically affordable to lower income households. The appel- 
late division held that the New York Court of Appeals, in its 
1975 Berenson decision did not intend to impose any such af- 
firmative duty.34 Recall that the court of appeals Berenson 
test includes an examination of whether the municipality con- 
sidered the needs of the region as well as the town for multi- 
ple housing.36 The appellate division stated that the New 
York Court of Appeals' earlier Berenson decision "[mlerely 
31. Id. at 149, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 922. 
32. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1985). 
33. This case, which was lost by the plaintiffs at the trial court and Appellate 
Department levels, is the first Berenson style case to be brought in New York by low- 
income plaintiffs who are requesting zoning practices that will make housing for them 
affordable. 
34. Suffolk Hous. Seros., 109 A.D.2d at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
35. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
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requires that a town allow for the construction of different 
types of housing in sufficient numbers for those people who 
want and can afford it."36 To accept the plaintiff's contention 
that the court intended an affirmative mandate to facilitate 
the construction of housing affordable to lower income house- 
holds, "would require us [the court] to work a change of his- 
toric proportions in the development of New York zoning law, 
a step which we respectfully decline to take."37 The New York 
Court of Appeals has agreed to review the unanimous decision 
of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Suffolk 
Housing Services. 
A very different decision was rendered in Asian American 
for Equality v. Kochss by the Supreme Court of the First Ju- 
dicial Department, shortly after the determination by the ap- 
pellate division of Suffolk Housing Services. As compared to 
the previous New York exclusionary zoning cases, the Asian 
American case arose out of a novel set of circumstances. In 
this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the various density bonus 
provisions of New York City's zoning ordinance, as applied to 
the heavily settled Chinatown area, displaced lower income 
residents and, therefore violated the principles articulated in 
Berenson. This court in considering its options, referred di- 
rectly to the Suffolk Housing Services appellate division deci- 
sion and stated: 
While New York courts have previously been hesitant to 
adopt the Mount Laurel doctrine because it places a 
heavier burden on municipalities, upon consideration of 
the important constitutional considerations at stake, it is 
my opinion that it is now appropriate to adopt the Mount 
Laurel doctrine as the law of New Y ~ r k . ~ ~  
After the court asserted its adoption of the Mount Laurel 
doctrine,'O i t  held that "[iln light of the needs of the China- 
36. Suffolk Hous. Servs., 109 A.D.2d at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
37. Id. at 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
38. 129 Misc.2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1985). 
39. Id. at 82, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848. 
40. "[Tlhe zoning power is no more abused by keeping out the region's poor than 
Heinonline - -  4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 10 1986-1987 
19861 COMPARATIVE ANAL YSZS 11 
town community, a well-balanced plan may be held to consist 
of a plan which facilitates the construction of quality low-in- 
come h~using."~' 
As set forth in the preceding paragraphs, it is easily ascer- 
tained that New York law regarding exclusionary zoning is in 
flux. The factors which the New York Court of Appeals estab- 
lished are broad, allowing the lower courts great discretion in 
fashioning their decisions. This has resulted in inconsistent 
decisions within New York, continued litigation on the issue, 
and has forced some courts to seek other viable alternatives, 
such as in the Asian American case, in the hope of making a 
fair and just determination. 
111. The Constitutional Underpinnings 
A. Berenson v.  Town of New Castle 
The standards for judging whether zoning ordinances in 
New York are unconstitutionally exclusionary were first ar- 
ticulated by the state's highest court in 1975. In the first Ber- 
erason decision, the New York Court of Appeals clarified cer- 
tain fundamental principles regarding the delegation and use 
of the power to zone. First, the court stated that "the primary 
goal of a zoning ordinance must be to provide for the develop- 
ment of a balanced, cohesive community which will make effi- 
cient use of the town's available land."42 Second, "in enacting 
a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional 
needs and requirements. . . . There must be a balancing of the 
local desire to maintain the status quo within the community 
and the greater public interest that regional [housing] needs 
be met."43 Third, that "[allthough we are aware of the tradi- 
tional view that zoning acts only upon the property lying 
within the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recog- 
by forcing out the resident poor." Id. at 81, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 847 (quoting Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 214,456 A.2d 
390, 418 (1983)(Mount Laurel I n .  
41. Id. at 88, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 851. 
42. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241, 
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975). 
43. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (emphasis in original). 
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nized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the 
boundaries of the municipality."" 
B. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel 
In 1975, the same year that the Berenson standards were 
created, New Jersey's highest court handed down the most 
far-reaching exclusionary zoning case in state law history.'" 
This case was reinterpreted and rendered much more specific 
in a 1983 decision by the same court.46 The two Mount Laurel 
cases are based on language similar to that used by the Beren- 
son court. In articulating the standards for judging whether 
zonging ordinances a r e  unconstitutionally exclusionary, the 
Mount Laurel cases set forth three principles. First, that 
"[wlhen the exercise of . . . [police] power by a municipality 
affects something as fundamental as housing, the general wel- 
fare includes more than the welfare of that municipality and 
its citizens. . . . Municipal land use regulations that conflict 
with the general welfare thus defined abuse the police power 
and are uncon~titutional."~~ Second, that 
it is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning 
power is a police power of the state and the local author- 
ity is acting only as a delegate of that power and is re- 
stricted in the same manner as is the state. So, when reg- 
ulation does have a substantial external impact, the 
welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the 
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must 
be recognized and served.'" 
And third, that "each such municipality [must] . . . plan and 
provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportu- 
nity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, includ- 
44. Id. 
45. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)(Mount Laurel I ) .  
46. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township o f  Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983)(Mount Laurel In. 
47. Id. at 208, 456 A.2d at 415. 
48. Mount Laurel I ,  67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726. 
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ing, of course, low and moderate cost housing to meet the 
needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who 
may desire to live within its b~undaries."'~ Thus, the courts in 
both these states based their decisions on similar constitu- 
tional principles. Since the constitutional principles employed 
are similar, it follows that the dramatically different results 
stem from a markedly different application of these principles 
in the two states. 
IV. Defining Municipal Responsibility 
Both the Berenson and the Mount Laurel cases trace the 
exercise of local zoning power back to the grant of police 
power by the people to the state government through the 
adoption of the state constitution. The zoning power dele- 
gated to local governments by the state legislature must, by 
definition, be exercised with the needs of the people of the 
state as a whole in mind. Both courts have used similar logic 
to define this obligation. The two courts, however, have cho- 
sen different methods of implementing their holdings with re- 
spect to exclusionary zoning. 
A. What is the Nature of the Obligation Under these Cases? 
In New Jersey "a developing municipality . . . must, by its 
land use regulations, make realistically possible the opportu- 
nity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all 
categories of people who may desire to live there" which in- 
cludes the low- and moderate-income r e ~ i d e n t s . ~ ~  The munici- 
pality must permit multi-familty housing "as well as small 
dwellings on very small lots, low cost housing of other types 
and, in general, high density zoning, without artificial and un- 
justifiable minimum requirements . . . to meet the full pano- 
ply of these  need^."^' 
In New York "in determining the validity of an ordinance 
excluding multi-family housing as a permitted use, we must 
49. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728. 
50. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32. 
51. Id. 
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consider the general purposes which the concept of zoning 
seeks to serve."62 In excluding new multiple housing, it must 
be determined whether the town "considered the needs of the 
region as well as the town for such housing."63 Thus, New 
Jersey looks to the categories of people who desire to live in 
that municipality while in New York one must look beyond 
the municipality and consider the general needs of the region. 
B. Do All Communities Have These Obligations? 
In both New York and New Jersey, it is principally "de- 
veloping communities" that must comply with the obligations 
imposed by these anti-exclusionary zoning cases. For New 
Jersey, "the general welfare which developing municipalites 
like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their bound- 
aries and cannot be parochially confined. . . ."64 In New York, 
the Berenson line of cases has similarly confined itself to de- 
veloping communi t ie~ .~~  The logic behind this limitation is 
straightforward. "The effective development of a region 
should not and cannot be made to depend upon the adventi- 
tious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed de- 
cades or even centuries ago. . . . ,966 
In New Jersey, the court relied on the New Jersey State 
Development Guide Plan 67 (SDGP) as the method for deter- 
52. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241, 
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975). 
53. Id. at  111, 341 N.E.2d at  243, 378 N.Y.S. at  681. 
54. Mount Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at  727-28. 
55. "In view of the fact that the Town of Pompey, unlike New Castle, is conced- 
edly not a developing community . . . we agree that the Berenson test need not be 
applied in the instant case." Town of Pompey v. Parker, 53 A.D.2d 125, 127, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (1976), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 805, 377 N.E.2d 741, 406 N.Y.S.2d 287 
(1978). 
56. Duffcon Concrete Prods. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513,64 A.2d 347, 
350 (1949) (cited in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 
67 N.J. 151, 177, 336 A.2d 713, 726-727 (1975)(Mount Laurel 0). 
57. New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning, State Development 
Guide Plan (May 1980). The state legislature had authorized the creation of the State 
Development Guide Plan (SDGP) "for the future improvement and development of 
the State." 1961 N.J. Laws c. 47 § 15(a)(2). In 1985 the New Jersey legislature 
amended that act, requiring a new plan be developed, a "State Development and 
Redevelopment Guide Plan." 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. c. 398, 3 1 (codified at  N.J. 
Heinonline - -  4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 14 1986-1987 
19861 COMPARATIVE ANAL YSZS 15 
mining which municipalities have an obligation to meet the 
Mount Laurel mandate. The SDGP has been used to guide 
state investment policies, capital growth strategies, program 
policies, and to determine, in general, where growth should be 
encouraged and discouraged. In the court's view, the SDGP 
clearly sets forth "the state's policy as to where growth should 
be encouraged and discouraged, . . . [and] effectively serve[s] 
as a blueprint for the implementation of the Mount Laurel 
doctrine."" In New York, no uniform method has been 
adopted to determine which municipalities are developing in 
order to meet the Berenson obligation. As in Town of Pompey 
u. P ~ r k e r , ~ "  these decisions are being made on a case by case 
basis, in the absense of a regional or statewide standards such 
as those relied upon in New Jersey. 
In many developing communities the argument is made 
that lower income, higher density housing has negative envi- 
ronmental impacts. A town may purport that it's potential for 
growth is "limited because of its environmental setting and 
rural  characteristic^."^^ Other arguments include the assertion 
that "[tlhere are no sewers and no water lines, many of the 
roads are unpaved. . . However, in most instances, the 
possible negative environmental impact of a specific develop- 
ment can be provided for and mitigated by proper municipal 
and site planning. 
The real issue is what type of growth a municipality will 
permit. With sophisticated new zoning and development tech- 
niques such as cluster and planned-unit development, on-site 
systems and buffering techniques, housing affordability and 
environmental conservation can be harmonious objectives. 
The impetus of Mount Laurel and Berenson is one additional 
force that invites more careful and considered planning at the 
Stat. Ann. 1 52:18A-196 (West 1985)). This document will replace the SDGP. 
58. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 236, 456 
A.2d 390, 440 (1983)(Mount Laurel I n .  
59. 53 A.D.2d 125,385 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 805,377 N.E.2d 741, 
406 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978). 
60. Brown, County Effort on Zoning Meets Resistance, N.Y. Times, March 22, 
1987, 5 8 (Real Estate), at 13, col. 1 (Westchester ed.). 
61. Id. 
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local level. In many circumstances, large-lot single-family 
housing, the preferred zoning in many communities, is ineffec- 
tive in preserving environmental quality. Higher density, clus- 
tered developments, the type preferred by developers, allows 
for the preservation of valuable open space, for the prevention 
of environmental contamination, the elimination of septic 
fields, and the limitation of traffic hazards. Leftover notions of 
the negative impact of density development that come from 
the traditional grid-pattern zoning no longer militate against 
high density deve l~pmen t .~~  
C .  How are Regional Housing Needs Defined? 
The 1975 Mount Laurel I decision defined a developing 
municipality's obligation to afford the opportunity for decent 
and adequate low- and moderate-income housing to extend a t  
least to "that municipality's fair share of the present and pro- 
spective regional need theref~r."'~ Subsequent to that deci- 
sion, there was considerable confusion as to how the region's 
needs, and the municipality's share of those needs were to be 
defined, because under Mount Laurel I the New Jersey court 
had not assigned a numerical fair share to each developing 
community. The two hundred page Mount Laurel 11 decision 
was a reaction by the court to the lack of progress under the 
relatively general standards adopted by the court under 
Mount Laurel I. The Mount Laurel II court addressed these 
issues frontally. First, it decided that each municipality must 
be assigned a numerical fair share of its region's need.e4 Sec- 
ond, it defined the need strictly in terms of low- and moder- 
ate-income housing, and further defined low and moderate by 
adopting the standards used for federal housing subsidy pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~ ~  Third, it defined "region" as "'that general area 
62. See Stever, A Brief Essay on Inclusionary Zoning and Environmental Zon- 
ing, 4 Pace Envt'l L. Rev. 157 (1986). 
63. Southern Burlington County NAACP v .  Township o f  Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 
151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 724, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)(Mount Laurel). 
64. Southern Burlington County NAACP v .  Township o f  Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 
158, 220-23, 456 A.2d 390, 421-22 (1983)(Mount Laurel II). 
65. Id. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8. 
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which constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of 
which the subject municipality is a part, and from which the 
prospective population of the municipality would substan- 
tially be drawn, in the absence of exclusionary zoning. 9 ,966 
Fourth, it established broad guidelines for defining a fair 
share methodology by indicating that a formula that was 
based on projected employment and ratables would be 
favored.e7 
The Mount Laurel 11 court understood that even these 
specific guidelines would need greater definition. The task of 
making these standards more specific was divided into three 
steps: first, determination of a region; second, an assessment 
of the housing need in the region; and third, an allocation of 
that need. The court provided for the completion of these 
steps by assigning three judges to hear all Mount Laurel II 
cases throughout the state.68 It was the court's intent that this 
would result in the relatively early and "fairly consistent de- 
termination" of regions and regional needs.6B 
It  is important to emphasize that the venture of the New 
Jersey judiciary into this relatively uncharted area was the re- 
sult of the court's great frustration with the lack of local com- 
pliance with the Mount Laurel I decision. 
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial 
order invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel re- 
mains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance. 
Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, 
the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount 
Laurel's determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel 
is not alone; we believe that there is widespread non-com- 
pliance with the constitutional mandate of our original 
opinion in this case.'O 
66. Id. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township 
of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 537, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219). 
67. Id. at 248-58, 456 A.2d at 436-41. 
68. Id. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 198, 456 A.2d at 410. 
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In New York, the Berenson courts have rejected any no- 
tion of assigning a numerical fair share to an exclusionary mu- 
nicipality. "[Tlhe Court of Appeals [in 19751 impliedly held 
that New Castle per se did not have to bear any 'fair share' of 
any such housing burden."?' Instead, the Berenson doctrine 
is, that the courts are to "assess the reasonableness of what 
the locality has done,"72 in light of present and foreseeable 
local and regional housing needs. Then in the 1983 Blitz deci- 
sion, the appellate division articulated yet another standard 
called the "expected proportionate share" doctrine.73 Here the 
judicial inquiry should be "whether [a town's] provisions for 
housing are at all commensurate with some general notion of 
its expected contribution to the regional housing need."?' By 
reviewing the evidence submitted in the second Berenson case 
and the Blitz case, it can be implied that the housing region, 
at least in Westchester County, is the entire county as af- 
fected by the overall housing demand in the metropolitan 
area. This general definition of the region has not undergone 
further refinement in New York. 
Emerging from the Berenson line of cases, is an under- 
standing of the extreme importance placed on an evidentiary 
development of the actual, provable housing need in the ap- 
plicable region. The New York courts assess the reasonable- 
ness of what a municipality has done with its zoning ordi- 
nance. In so doing, they give a presumption of validity to the 
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, and then require 
those challenging the ordinance to bear the burden of proving 
its lack of reasonableness. This burden can be overcome by 
proving that the locality's share of unmet regional and local 
housing needs is not accommodated by its present zoning 
ordinance. 
The holding of the 1979 Berenson case, which was written 
four years before the Mount Laurel XI decision, relied heavily 
71. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 522, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 679 
(1983). 
72. Berenson v, Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975). 
73. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92,98, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1983). 
74. Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
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on the fact that no court had ever required that concrete 
figures be specially found or imposed by judicial fiat. "The 
[Oakwood at Madison] court held that numerical housing 
quotas . . . were not realistically translatable into specific sub- 
stantive zoning amendments. . . ."76 Ironically, it was the lack 
of action in New Jersey under the general guidelines then in- 
corporated into its earlier decisions, that led the Mount Lau- 
rel 11 court in 1983 to assign specific numerical fair share re- 
sponsibility to offending municipalities. 
D. What Relevance is Given To Legislative Definitions' of  
Housing Needs? 
In both New York and New Jersey, the courts have de- 
ferred to legislative and governmental policies with respect to 
zoning. In the original Berenson case, for example, the New 
York Court of Appeals wrote that: 
Zoning . . . is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite 
anomalous that a court should be required to perform the 
tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we look to the 
Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to fos- 
ter the development of programs designed to achieve 
sound regional planning. . . . Until the day comes when 
regional, rather than local, governmental units can make 
such determinations, the courts must assess the reasona- 
bleness of what the locality has done.7e 
This attitude of deference, as articulated in Berenson, has 
continued in cases concerning exclusionary zoning in New 
Y ~ r k . ~ ~  In New Jersey, the Mount Laurel 11 court adopted the 
75. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at  517, 415 N.Y.S.2d a t  676 (quoting Oakwood a t  
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481,499, 371 A.2d 1192,1200 (1977)). 
76. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at  111, 341 N.E.2d a t  243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  682. 
77. In the Blitz case, legislative definitions of regional housing needs were given 
greater weight. 
The town urges that the county housing policy, with its stated goal of 50,000 
new housing units . . . should carry with it the same presumption of validity 
as any other legislative act; . . . . We agree with the town that the 50,000-unit 
goal is presumptively valid and the evidence a t  trial clearly established the 
rationality and soundness of that legislative finding. 
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State Development Guide Plan (SDGP) as a means of deter- 
mining which communities have an obligation to meet a fair 
share of regional needs. By so doing, the court implied that it 
would have relied on a specific housing need determination 
that appeared in the SDGP or a similar document prepared 
by an agency of the state. 
E. Is the Municipality's Obligation Limited to Meeting the 
Housing Needs of Lower Income People? 
In both New Jersey and New York, the constitutional de- 
fect in challenged zoning ordinances has been their tendency 
to exclude people of limited income. The Mount Laurel 11 
court required both a determination of the housing needs of 
lower income persons and that the municipality's fair share of 
those needs be met. Lower income was generally defined as 
income which renders a family eligible for federally subsidized 
housing programs.78 This definition of responsibility was a re- 
jection by the Mount Laurel 11 court of its earlier decision to 
allow municipalities to satisfy their obligations by amending 
their zoning regulations to render feasible the "least-cost" 
housing which private industry will undertake. Under Mount 
Laurel II, least-cost housing will only be allowed to satisfy a 
community's fair share after a showing that no combination of 
the ordinance's provisions and "other" actions, prove success- 
ful in providing housing that could be afforded by lower in- 
come people. 78 
Due to the fact that lower income housing has not re- 
sulted from the Berenson rulings in New York, it is largely 
thought that the Berenson cases are not founded on the provi- 
sion of lower income housing. However, the 1979 Berenson de- 
cision reversed the trial court's determination that New Castle 
must rezone to accommodate three thousand five hundred 
housing units because its determination was not limited to 
lower income housing needs. The court stated: 
Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 97, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835. 
78. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 
158, 221 n.8, 456 A.2d 390, 421 n.8 (1983)(Mount Laurel 11). 
79. Id. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451-52. 
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In point of fact then, the multi-family housing quota 
of three thousand and five hundred units, adopted by 
Special Term as New Castle's 'fair share' of regional 
housing needs is a highly abstract and speculative num- 
ber. . . . [Tlhe court apparently failed to appreciate that 
the figure itself was referable to the housing market in 
general, both as to income groups and the type of housing 
. . . and was not directly referable to the needs of the low 
income groups with which the [I975 Berenson] court was 
primarily concerned. The use of a 'fair share' goal has 
never been judicially approved in the context of the hous- 
ing needs of the population a t  large. Its raison d'etre lies 
in the housing needs of the low and moderate income 
groups. . . . Moreover, Special Term's judgment cannot 
and does not insure that any of the multi-family units to 
be constructed will be anything other than luxury condo- 
miniums, with which the market may already be 
saturated.'' 
Thus, the courts in both states have limited their decisions by 
making it clear that municipalities have an obligation to meet 
the housing needs of low-income people, though the courts 
postulated different methods for the municipalities to use in 
carrying out the court's decisions. 
F .  How Are Municipalities to Provide for Housing 
Affordable to  Lower Income People? 
New York, under the 1979 Berenson decision, incorpo- 
rated the earlier New Jersey "least-cost" housing concept. 
Least-cost housing has been defined as housing that can be 
constructed after the removal of "all excessive restrictions and 
exactions and after a thorough use by a municipality of all 
affirmative devices that might lower  cost^."^' In Berenson, 
when the court adopted the least-cost method, it stated that: 
[Wlhile not sufficient to save the zoning ordinance from 
80. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 520-21, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 
678 (1979)(emphasis in original). 
81. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451. 
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invalidation, the town's contention that multi-family 
rental housing (the type most affordable by persons of 
low and moderate income) cannot be constructed today 
even with governmental subsidies unless the land is pub- 
licly owned or figured a t  zero cost is not without some 
merit, especially if we are talking about providing lower 
income housing in sizeable quantities. Indeed, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's subsequent focus upon 'least- 
cost' housing as opposed to low-income housing is attrib- 
utable to its recognition that it will be virtually impossi- 
ble to provide large amounts of newly constructed hous- 
ing for the economially less fortunate in the foreseeable 
future.82 
Thus, New York found the Madisone3 rationale concerning 
least cost more appropriate in application than other theories 
postulated for providing low-income housing. 
As noted, the Mount Laurel II court greatly modified its 
allowance for "least-cost" solutions by limiting its use to situ- 
ations where no combination of actions proves capable of pro- 
viding housing actually affordable to lower income  person^.^' 
In part, this change is based on the rejection of the notion 
that middle-income, or least-cost housing would eventually fil- 
ter down to the poor. The principal technique now relied on 
in New Jersey is rezoning that provides density bonuses in ex- 
change for the provision of lower income housing. The amount 
of lower income housing to be provided is suggested by the 
court to be twenty percent of the total to be c o n s t r ~ c t e d . ~ ~  A 
developer is to be awarded additional density, which in turn, 
allows him to build and market more housing units than per- 
mitted by the underlying zoning. This technique allows for 
the production of lower income housing because a portion of 
the value added by the density bonus is used to reduce the 
price of the lower income units. Additionally, the units can be 
82. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521,415 N.Y.S.2d at 678. See Oakwood at Madison v. 
Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 510-14, 371 A.2d 1192, 1206-08 (1977). 
83. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 517, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (quoting Oakwood at 
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 499, 371 A.2d 1192, 1200 (1977)). 
84. See supra p. 18. 
85. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 279 n.37, 456 A.2d at 452 n.37. 
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priced so that the market rate houses bear all the land costs 
and a high proportion of the infrastructure costs. The experi- 
ence under Mount Laurel 11 suggests that sufficient value can 
be added and other costs reduced by this technique to reduce 
the cost of the lower income units so they are affordable to 
lower income households. The recent results in New Jersey 
under Mount Laurel 11 using this density bonus technique 
counter the New York court's assertion that "it will be virtu- 
ally impossible to provide large amounts of newly constructed 
housing for the economically less fortunate . . . . ,386 
G.  What Specific Actions Must Municipalities Take Under 
These Inclusionary Zoning Cases? 
Mount Laurel 11 required that developing New Jersey 
communities employ a number of affirmative steps to provide 
lower income housing. First, they must rezone sufficient land 
at higher densities. Although the court understood that higher 
densities are often a prerequisite for affordability, it also un- 
derstood that higher density zoning, alone, seldom produces 
affordable lower income ho~sing.~'  Second, zoning ordinances 
must be amended to remove cost generating restrictions and 
exactions, and to include density bonuses, mandatory lower 
income set-aside  requirement^,^^ or mobile home construc-, 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  To maintain the affordability of these units on re- 
rental or resale, the court sanctioned the use of rent controls 
and resale price controls.B0 Third, the court indicated that 
86. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at  678. 
The use of density bonuses in New Jersey since the Mount Laurel II decision in 
1983 has produced remarkable results. According to a recent study carried out in a 
three-countv area in central New Jersev. a total of 1.754 units of low- and moderate- 
-, 
income housing units were occupied, being built, approved or pending approval. See 
Kinsey & Hand, supra note 3. The study showed that lower-income units were being 
provided in eleven of the seventeen townships in the three-county area. In the three 
years since Mount Laurel 11, more lower-income housing was being provided than in 
fifty years of federal housing subsidy programs, which had in this area been responsi- 
ble for only 1,334 units of affordable housing. Id. 
87. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at  261, 456 A.2d a t  443. 
88. Id. a t  267-74, 456 A.2d a t  446-50. 
89. Id. at  274-77, 456 A.2d a t  450-51. 
90. Id. at  269, 456 A.2d at  447. 
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"[wlhere appropriate, municipalities should provide a realistic 
opportunity for housing through other municipal action inex- 
tricably related to land  regulation^."^^ Such actions could in- 
clude granting a tax abatement where it is a prerequisite for a 
housing subsidy, passing resolutions required for a project to 
qualify for tax-exempt financing, or participating in the fed- 
eral community development block grant program. The court 
did not go on to require municipal funding of supportive in- 
frastructure, an issue that is still open under Mount Laurel II. 
Thus, the New Jersey court has decided to require municipali- 
ties to act aggressively and affirmatively to insure that lower 
income units are actually c o n s t r u ~ t e d . ~ ~  By contrast, the New 
York rule is more passive: 
[Zloning ordinances will go no further than determining 
what may or may not be built; . . . in the absence of gov- 
ernment subsidies. Thus, in terms of low-to-moderate in- 
come rental housing-generally conceded to the most 
pressing need . . . even the most liberal zoning ordinance, 
in the absence of affirmative governmental action to shift 
the balance of market forces, will have no success in pro- 
moting such housing cons t ru~ t ion .~~  
There is, however, some recognition in the Berenson line 
of cases that what is achievable in New Jersey will work in 
New York. The 1979 Berenson court held the door open for 
more aggressive judicial action if New Castle continued to act 
in bad faith. It  indicated that New York courts may give ex- 
plicit, qualitative instructions to guide the municipality in its 
rez~ning.~' The Berenson court cited the New Jersey Oak- 
91. Id. at  264, 456 A.2d at 444. 
92. The potential envisioned by the Mount Laurel II mandate is currently being 
realized as the number of actual low- and moderate-income units constructed in New 
Jersey dramatically increases. 
93. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (1983). 
The case was decided by the appellate division just six months after the New Jersey 
Supreme Court adopted a wholly different view of the extent to which zoning ordi- 
nance revisions can go in creating lower income housing. 
94. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 518, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 
676 (1979). 
Heinonline - -  4 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 24 1 9 8 6 - 1 9 8 7  
19861 COMPARATIVE ANAL YSZS 25 
wood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of  Madisons6 case as illus- 
trative of what courts in New York might do. In Madison, the 
court directed the township to allocate substantial land areas 
for small-lot single-family houses, and to substantially enlarge 
the areas for small-lot single-family houses.s6 In addition, the 
township was ordered to substantially enlarge the multi-fam- 
ily apartment district, to modify building restrictions in vari- 
ous districts, and to eliminate undue cost-generating restric- 
tions. There appears to be no reason in such a case why a 
court in New York could not go on to specify density bonuses, 
set-asides, and mobile homes, if it were shown that such tech- 
niques were needed to accomplish the purpose of providing 
housing affordable to lower income households. 
H. What Remedies Will the Court Use for Invalid Zoning? 
Mount Laurel 11 employed three remedies. First, the de- 
- - 
veloper who brings a successful exclusionary zoning suit will 
ordinarily be authorized to construct his project. This is called 
the "builder's remed~."~' Second, the court may employ a 
95. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). 
96. Id. at 553, 371 A.2d at  1228. 
97. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 
158, 279-81, 456 A.2d 390, 452-53 (1983)(Mount Laurel In. 
In 1985 the New Jersey legislature passed a Fair Housing Act, which imposed a 
legisaltive moratorium on the "builder's remedy." 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 222 § 
28 (codified at  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-328 (West 1986)). The moratorium applied to 
exclusionary zoning litigation which had been filed after January 20, 1983, unless a 
final judgment providing for a builder's remedy had already beeen rendered for the 
developer. Id. This moratorium terminates upon municipalities adopting resolutions 
to submit a fair share housing plan to the agency created by the act (the Council on 
Affordable Housing); submitting a "housing element" to that agency; and submitting 
any fair share housing ordinances which have been enacted. N.J. Stat. Ann. 8 52:27D- 
309 (West 1986). The minimum statutory period given for the municipalities to sub- 
mit such documentation was nine months. At the end of that period the moratorium 
would be terminated. This provision in the Act was then attacked as being unconsti- 
tutional, the plaintiffs arguing that the provision usurped the judiciary's exclusive 
powers to provide relief. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the section was 
constitutional: total preclusion of the builders remedy had not occurred; "and most 
importantly, we have never elevated the judicially created builder's remedy, in partic- 
ular, to the level of a constitutionally protected right." The Hills Dev. Co. v. Town- 
ship of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 46, 510 A.2d 621, 645 (1986). That case is commonly 
known as Mount Laurel III. 
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master (an expert), after a trial in which a zoning ordinance 
has been i n ~ a l i d a t e d . ~ ~  The master's role is to work with the 
offending municipality and the plaintiff to negotiate the re- 
quirements of a new zoning ordinance. Third, where a munici- 
pality fails to  adopt a satisfactory ordinance on its own, the 
court can issue orders requiring adoption of specific ordi- 
nances, imposing moratoria on other development, invalidat- 
ing other ordinances or regulations, or requiring approval of 
particular applications to construct housing, including lower 
income units. 
The Berenson line of cases has also identified a number 
of remedies. As in Mount Laurel, Berenson adopted the 
builder's remedy which awards the plaintiff developer a rezon- 
ing for higher density, multi-family deve l~prnent .~~  Another 
remedy is that the zoning ordinance may be declared uncon- 
stitutionally exclusionary, and that the municipality may be 
instructed to rezone to cure the constitutional defect and to 
accomodate its share of the regional housing need.loO Finally, 
courts may retain jurisdiction of such cases to order more 
comprehensive relief if the local legislative body fails to act in 
good faith.lol 
V. The Major Unresolved Issues in New York 
There are several issues to be resolved by the New York 
courts in the coming year. The appeals of Suffolk Housing 
Services and Asian American provide the court with a unique 
opportunity to explain its earlier reasoning in the Berenson 
and Kurzius decisions. The Asian American decision is par- 
ticularly important because that court has specifically em- 
braced the Mount Laurel obligation. The issues presented in 
the lower court decisions involve a web of considerations, 
98. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 281-85, 456 A.2d at 453-55. 
99. Unpublished opinion, Westchester County Sup. Ct. (Dec. 30, 1977), dicussed 
in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.Pd, 506, 507,415 N.Y.S. 669, 670 (1979). 
100. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 523-24, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669, 
680 (1979). See also Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 96-98, 463 N.Y.S.2d 
832, 834-36 (1983). 
101. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 523:24 n.2, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 680 n.2. . 
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which are best addressed as a whole. 
The first issue is the basic view of judicial responsibility 
in reviewing land use matters. What standards should the ju- 
diciary use in determining whether local ordinances are con- 
stitutional? If local zoning is found to be unconstitutional, 
how far should the courts go in supervising the process of con- 
forming that zoning with constitutional standards? 
The second issue is a practical corollary of the first. As- 
suming a judicial inclination to prescribe local action, what 
can be done to actually create affordable housing? Is there ev- 
idence that suggests that affirmative land use action can result 
in truly affordable housing? To the extent that it is perceived 
by the judiciary that local zoning amendments cannot result 
in affordable housing, it may be reluctant to place a heavy 
burden on local governments in that regard. 
The third issue has to do with who is to be protected by 
the judiciary in these cases and how that protection is to be 
insured. Is the legal obligation primarily focused on providing 
housing for lower-income people? What mechanisms exist to 
provide effective remedies for such people? If private develop- 
ers, who are the plaintiffs in most exclusionary zoning cases, 
are to be rewarded with zoning changes, how can the court 
insure that such changes principally benefit lower income 
people? 
The fourth issue is whether the court perceives as practi- 
cal the task of proving local and regional housing needs, and 
of defining the extent of each municipality's obligation to 
meet those needs. Can these matters competently be proved? 
Can the court supervise the process of defining the local share 
of established lower-income needs? 
Finally, the courts must address the limitations on any 
burden it may choose to impose on localities. Does the bur- 
den, if any is found to exist, apply equally to all communities 
of whatever size, no matter where located? If not, what stan- 
dards are to be used to distinguish among them? Are there 
any economic or environmental standards that should be ap- 
plied. to increase the burden in some instances and decrease it 
in others? 
In resolving these issues on appeal, the court would be 
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helped by taking a comprehensive view of them all. How far 
the judiciary will go will likely be influenced by whether the 
court perceives that the class of persons protected by the con- 
stitutional principles at issue in these cases can truly be 
benefitted by judicial action. Similarly, its view will be influ- 
enced by whether it believes that manageable methods exist 
for defining and allocating need, and pinpointing the responsi- 
bility of differently situated municipalities. 
VI. Conclusion 
There are five key observations made in the foregoing 
analysis. First, both the Mount Laurel and Berenson cases are 
based on similar interpretations of their state constitutions. 
Both hold that the local zoning power of developing communi- 
ties must be exercised with the housing needs of the broader 
region in mind. Both evidence a specific concern for the hous- 
ing needs of low- and moderate-income households, because of 
their " 'circumstances of . . . economic helplessness.' "'02 Both 
hold that the exclusionarily zoned municipalities must accom- 
modate these needs by rezoning which provides for more af- 
fordable types of housing. 
Second, the specific mandates issued by the two courts 
are also similar. Mount Laurel requires developing municipal- 
ities to plan and provide by their land use regulations, a rea- 
sonable opportunity for an appropriate variety of choice of 
housing including low- and moderate-cost housing. Berenson 
provides that a community must show that it has reasonably 
provided, through its zoning, for the present and the future 
needs of its residents, and its expected proportionate share of 
the unmet regional needs. . 
Third, New Jersey has gone further than New York in 
articulating the ways in which land use regulations should be 
exercised to provide greater housing opportunity. For exam- 
ple, frequent references are made in the Mount Laurel cases 
to eliminating "cost generating restrictions and  exaction^,"'^^ 
102. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678 (quoting Pascack Ass'n. v. 
Mayor & Council of Washington Township, 74 N.J. 470, 480, 379 A.2d 6, 11 (1977)). 
103. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 
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and to using "set-asides," and small-lot zoning.lo4 Addition- 
ally, the Mount Laurel 11 case exhibited an unprecedented 
faith in the ability of municipalities, through the exercise ot 
their land use regulations alone, to create low- and moderate- 
cost housing. 
The Berenson doctrine is simply less developed in this re- 
gard. To date, the plaintiffs in Berenson cases, with the ex- 
ception of Brookhaven, have been developers who have sought 
authority to build multi-family housing at moderate densities 
to provide middle to upper income housing. The Berenson 
cases refer primarily to the exclusion of "multi-family hous- 
ing" as the offending characteristic of challenged ordinances. 
At the time that the last appellate division Berenson case was 
decided, the "least-cost" doctrine was being followed in New 
Jersey, and the belief among the New Jersey and New York 
courts was that the amendment of land use regulation alone 
was unlikely to produce a significant amount of lower income 
housing. Berenson referenced the New Jersey experience in 
1979 and concluded: "it will be virtually impossible to provide 
large amounts of newly constructed housing for the economi- 
cally less fortunate in the foreseeable future."lo6 Four years 
later, the least-cost doctrine was all but repudiated in New 
Jersey and the remarkable record of lower income housing 
production that has resulted from that change in judicial atti- 
tude must be recognized, if not followed, in New York. 
Fourth, New Jersey has also been more aggressive than 
its sister state in defining and allocating responsibility for re- 
gional housing need. Through the use of special judges and a 
broad range of experts, regions are being defined, needs deter- 
mined, and specific allocations of need are being assigned to 
developing communities. The Mount Laurel 11 court took 
these steps because of its impatience with the lack of specific 
progress in complying with its more general 1975 guidelines. 
No such system for need determination and allocation exists 
in New York. In fact, the New York courts have rejected the 
158, 258-59, 456 A.2d 390, 441 (1983)(Mount Laurel II). 
104. Id. at 267-74, 456 A.2d at 446-50. 
105. Berenson, 67 A.D.2d at 521, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 678. 
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notion of judically allocating fair share goals to specific com- 
munities. It  was noted, in the 1979 Berenson decision, that no 
court had ever made a numerical fair share allocation. Here, 
also, there has been a change in New Jersey. Specific numeri- 
cal fair shares have been judically mandated and in a rela- 
tively short period, zoning to accommodate a large number of 
lower and middle income units has resulted. 
Fifth, although the New York courts may remain firm in 
their decision regarding the allocation of housing need to indi- 
vidual communities, they have already put in place judicial 
guidelines for ordering rezoning based on a specific showing of 
regional needs and of a community's failure to meet its ex- 
pected proportionate share of those needs. The New York ap- 
proach is to proceed case by case and to require of its plain- 
tiffs explict proof of regional needs and of local responsibility. 
Where such proof is not offered, no relief can be expected. 
The burden of proving the unreasonableness of a zoning ordi- 
nance can be met by a showing that unfulfilled regional needs 
have not been considered or accommodated by that ordi- 
nance. Besides the regional need approach, the 1979 Berenson 
court opened the door to the consideration of a "fair share" 
allocation of lower income housing. The court rejected in that 
case the evidence presented because it referenced housing 
need generally, and was not limited to the lower income 
needs. By linking "fair share" with lower income needs only, 
the New York Court of Appeals may find this theory of alloca- 
tion more palitable. 
Finally, both courts are reluctantly involved in needs de- 
termination and other planning issues because of the lack of 
assistance with these matters by other branches of govern- 
ment. The New Jersey court effectively used the legislatively 
sanctioned, and administratively issued, State Development 
Guide Plan as the overall structure for implementing its man- 
dates. Under Berenson, regional and state legislators and 
planners have been called on to define needs and responsibili- 
ties. A county planner's testimony has been relied on to deter- 
mine local compliance with regional needs, and a county hous- 
ing goal has been given a presumption of legislative validity. 
In the absence of effective guidance by county, regional 
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and state officials, these important land use decisions will con- 
tinue to be decided by the vagaries of litigation. Particularly 
in New York, the future use and effect of Berenson will be 
determined primarily by those who decide to initiate litigation 
under this line of cases, and the purposes for which such suits 
are brought. 
VII. Postscript 
A. Introduction 
On June 11, 1987, the New York Court of Appeals af- 
firmed the decision of the appellate division in Suffolk Hous- 
ing Services u. Town Of B r o o k h ~ u e n , ~ ~ ~  dismissing the com- 
plaint.'07 Chief Judge Wachtler, writing for a unanimous 
court,'OS stated that "[iln view of the affirmed factual find- 
i n g ~ " ' ~ ~  this court declines taking "the legislative action urged 
by plaintiffs in the context of this lawsuit."110 
B. Case Background 
The plaintiffs, before the court of appeals, sought a judg- 
ment which would "among other things, declare the zoning or- 
dinance of the Town of Brookhaven void in its entirety be- 
cause of the Town's failure to exercise its zoning power . . . to 
enable development of sufficient low-cost shelter."ll1 They 
also wished to obtain an order which would force the Town of 
Brookhaven to "take affirmative action to rectify the per- 
ceived housing shortage."'12 To achieve this the plaintiffs had 
"originally contended that the Town ordinance itself con- 
tained several exclusionary  devise^.""^ However, on appeal 
106. 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (9185). 
107. Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 87-150, slip op. at 6 (Ct. 
App. N.Y. June 11, 1987). 
108. Opinion by Chief Judge Wachtler. Judges Simons, Kaye, Hancock and Bel- 
lacosa concurred. Judge Alexander concurred in the result only. Judge Titone took no 
part in the decision. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. slip op. at 1. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. slip op. at 2. 
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they conceded "that the ordinance 'on its face does not betray 
the Town's opposition' to low-income, multi-familty hous- 
ing.""' Thus, their core contention before the court of appeals 
was that "the Town [had] impeded low income housing 
through its implementation of the ordinance."11s The proof 
presented by the plaintiffs in support of this contention was 
"that a developer wishing to construct any housing other than 
a single-family dwelling obtain a special permit."l16 
C. Court of Appeals Decision 
In this case the New York Court of Appeals concluded 
that its scope of review was limited by the affirmed factual 
findings,"" thus, it did not have to address the issue of 
whether the Town of Brookhaven's zoning ordinances met the 
standard's established by Beren~on."~ The record before the 
court substantiated the fact that "numerous developer appli- 
cations for multi-family and subsidized housing were ap- 
proved despite the special permit  procedure^.""^ In addition, 
the court found that the reason for the inadequate response to 
the need for low-cost multi-family housing was not the alleged 
chilling effect of the application procedures but the fact that 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
Under the Brookhaven zoning scheme, a developer may apply for permission 
to "cluster" developments in single-family residential districts ("the section 
281" application). . . . Only after public hearing may the Town Board by 
resolution grant the developer permission to build multi-family housing at  
desities already allowed in the underlying single-family zone. Alternatively, a 
developer may apply for rezoning to on of the two multi-family (MF-1 and 
MF-2) districts - a process that allows development at densities higher than 
those allowed in the single-family zone, but, according to plaintiffs, like the 
"section 281" application, exposes approval of project to vehement commu- 
nity opposition. The plaintiffs allege that the failure of the Town to "pre- 
map. . . inflates the cost of housing because a developer must submit to a 
protracted and expensive approval process; and, second, the process usually 
ends in failure because the Town zoning board inevitably bows to strong pub- 
lic sentiment against low-cost housing projects. 
Id. slip op. at  2-3. 
117. Id. slip op. at 4. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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developers did not wish to undertake these types of projects 
because of the lack of monetary return.120 The court, in sum, 
found that the plaintiffs "failed to demostrate that [the] ef- 
forts by the Town caused the claimed shortage of shelter."121 
The court distinguished the issues presented in the in- 
stant case from those in Berenson and concluded that the ap- 
plication of the Berenson doctrine was inappropriate. "In Ber- 
enson, plaintiffs challenged only the facial validity of a per se 
exclusion of multi-family dwellings from a zoning ordi- 
nance. . . . Plaintiffs here [Suffolk Housing Services] chal- 
leng[ed] not facial validity, but [the] legitimate implementa- 
tion of the ~rdinance." '~~ Though the court did not delve into 
a Berenson analysis, i t  felt compelled to remind the plaintiffs, 
and thus the New York legal community a t  large: first, that 
zoning was essentially a legislative task;123 and, second, that 
when reviewing such claims as presented in this case, the 
court desired a more particularized claim directed at a specific 
parcel of land.12' 
In conclusion, the court stated that "although it affirmed 
the dismissal of the complaint, the decision [should not] be 
read as revealing hostility to breaking down even unconstitu- 
tional zoning barriers that frustrate the deep human yearning 
of low-income and minority groups for decent housing they 
can afford in decent  surrounding^."'^^ The court stressed that 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. "Zoning, we have already recognized, is an essentially legislative task, 
and it is therefore anomalous that courts should be required to perform the tasks of a 
regional planner." Id. (citations omitted). 
124. Id. slip op. at  5. 
The desirability of a more particularized claim directed at  specific parcel 
of land or project or plan for housing is apparent from our cases. Historically, 
the law of zoning in this State had been concerned with development of indi- 
vidual plats. . . . In more recent years, we have required a regional approach 
- the considered balance of development of the individual parcel with im- 
plementation of a comprehensive plan, taking into account community 
needs. . . counterbalancing the parochial tendencies of local planning boards 
to insulate their communities from an influx of "less desirable" residents. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
125. Id. slip op. at  6. 
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due to the "abstract character of the case"12B no other deci- 
sion could be rendered except the drastic solution proposed 
by plaintiffs of "essentially legislative interference by the judi- 
ciary"la7 which the New York Court of Appeals felt compelled * 
to reject.la8 
D. Author's Comments 
We see, in this case, a continuation of the tendency in 
New York to place a heavy burden of proof on those who chal- 
lenge the validity of local zoning. We also see the state's high- 
est court suggesting that future exclusionary zoning litigation 
be focused more narrowly on specific parcels of land and be 
brought by plaintiffs who have a direct interest in what hap- 
pens on that land. 
This case, decided on June 11, 1987, follows by a few 
weeks the First Department Appellate Division's reversal of 
the supreme court's adoption of Mount Laurel in Asian 
Americans for Equality u. Koch.'*@ In essence, the Appellate 
Division found no comparison between the facts of Mount 
Laurel and those involved in New York City. The court con- 
cluded that, as a whole, New York City's zoning provides for a 
properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community as 
required by Berenson.130 
These recent decisions, handed down after the text of this 
article was completed, suggest that there is significant resis- 
tance in New York to the comprehensive approach taken in 
New Jersey. Apparently, in New York, the exclusionary zon- 
ing issue will continue to be decided on a case by case basis, 
with a heavy emphasis on competent proof, and on particular- 
ized claims and remedies. The critical issues, summarized 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Asian Americans for Equality v. Koch, - A . D . S d ,  514 N.Y.S.2d 939 
(1987). 
130. Id. at , 514 N.Y.S.2d at 951-952. 
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above, remain open for the courts to address as plaintiffs fol- 
low the new paths, as well as that blazed by the New Jersey 
judiciary. 
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